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Arms Races in International Politics: from the Nineteenth to the Twenty-First Century                                                                  
 
 




This chapter will test out the leading interpretative approaches to arms races by 
focusing on three periods of intense and competitive land armaments build-up in 
Continental Europe: 1866-70, 1887-93, and 1910-14. First, it will examine the biggest 
and best known of these episodes, the land armaments contest that preceded the First 
World War. Second, it will make comparisons with the 1860s rivalry that culminated 
in the Franco-Prussian War. Finally, it will consider a third and less well-known 
instance, that of the late 1880s, which began by displaying similar characteristics but 
whose outcome was a relatively stable military balance at a higher level of 
preparedness. Although it will identify both commonalities and points of contrast, 
among its key concerns will be the question of what makes arms races dangerous.  
 
- I - 1910-1914   
 
Nineteenth-century arms races have been less closely studied than their twentieth-
century counterparts.
2
 None the less, the graph of European military expenditure 
between the Franco-Prussian and the First World War highlights an upsurge in the 
half decade before 1914.
3
 In money terms, spending by the six European Great 
Powers rose between 1908 and 1913 by about 50 per cent. This was less dramatic than 
in the 1930s, and expenditure as a percentage of Gross National Product remained 
much lower than in the run-up to 1939 or during the acutest phases of the Cold War, 
but by pre-1900 standards both the rate of increase and the proportionate military 
burden were high.
4
 Certainly, defence outlays were divided between armies and 
navies, but the biggest pre-1914 naval race (that between Britain and Germany) was 
losing impetus on the eve of hostilities.
5
 It follows that land armaments expansion was 
primarily responsible for the overall increase. Although Britain kept its army 
expenditure stable, and Italy between 1911 and 1913 was distracted by a costly 
conflict in Libya, the four big Continental land Powers were engaged in a reciprocal 
and competitive sequence of measures that pitted the German/Austro-Hungarian 
(1879) alliance bloc on the one hand against the Franco-Russian (1891-94) alliance 
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bloc on the other. This land arms race bore more directly than did the Anglo-German 
naval race on the causation and timing of the outbreak of war.  
 
The origins of the land armaments race therefore matter. They may be examined with 
reference to each of the three main interpretations conventionally employed in 
armaments studies:  
 
Technological Imperative. Technological change was central to the development of 
the Anglo-German naval race, but more peripheral on land. Two recent innovations 
had necessitated wholesale re-equipping: the magazine rifle from the late 1880s and 
the quick-firing recoilless field gun from the late 1890s, starting with the French 
75mm. But both re-equipments had substantially been completed before the pre-war 
land arms race began, and although by 1910 new weapons were becoming available 
they contributed little to the expenditure surge. Machine guns are the most obvious 
instance, and European armies adopted them as standard after 1905, but only in small 
numbers.
6
 Quick-firing mobile heavy artillery (as distinct from field guns) cost more, 
but formed a category in which Germany was largely unrivalled, neither France, nor 
Russia, nor Austria-Hungary acquiring large quantities before war broke out. 
Similarly, airships and aircraft were coming into service as spectacular items that, 
however, counted for little in the spending totals.
7
 If the land arms race had continued 
beyond 1914, in contrast, equipment outlays would probably have been much bigger, 
notably on fortifications and on railways.
8
 France and Russia agreed in 1913 on a 
major programme of railway construction in Poland; the German authorities 
considered a counter-programme, as did Austria-Hungary in response to growing 
insecurity in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The French were updating their eastern frontier 
fortifications, especially round Verdun, and in 1912 the Germans decided to do 
likewise on their Russian border. Neither railways nor reinforced concrete cupola 
fortresses, however, were technologically novel. What was envisaged was fresh 
investment in established weapons systems; and this investment, in any case, the war 
forestalled. Moreover, as France’s 75 mm field gun and Britain’s HMS Dreadnought 
both show, technological advances often resulted from state initiatives, and to view 
technology as an entirely independent variable is misleading.  
 
Although the pre-war land arms race was partly a drive for more equipment,
9
 it was 
essentially a competition for heightened military readiness, to be achieved by 
organizational changes (such as modifying mobilization procedures) but primarily by 
maximizing trained manpower both in the standing army and in the reserves, through 
a combination of extending conscription service terms and calling up more men in 
each age cohort. In Samuel Huntington’s terminology, this race was quantitative 
rather than qualitative.
10
 Its most visible embodiment was a succession of new army 
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laws, passed by Germany in 1912 and 1913, by Austria-Hungary also in 1912 and in 
1914, by France in 1913, and by Russia in 1914. Smaller countries (notably Belgium 
with a law in 1913) also participated.
11
 Because the arms race took this form it is 
impossible to understand it without reference to domestic politics, which leads us to 
the second interpretative approach. 
 
Domestic Politics/Military-Industrial Complex. During the first decade of the 
twentieth century, army budgets and peacetime strengths grew only very slowly or 
were static or even declining. The reasons varied. In Germany the naval build-up 
received priority (as it did in Britain): the General Staff favoured army expansion but 
the War Ministry feared enlargement would diminish manpower quality and make the 
army less reliable for internal repression.
12
 In Austria-Hungary the General Staff also 
favoured expansion, but was blocked by opposition, on financial and other grounds, 
from the governments of the Austrian and Hungarian halves of the Dual Monarchy.
13
 
Between 1904 and 1911, moreover, despite supposedly being allies, Austria-Hungary 
and Italy were diverting resources into an arms race against each other, building 
fortifications in the Alps and battleships for the Adriatic.
14
 In France the military 
leadership was under attack because of its involvement in the Dreyfus Affair, and a 
1905 law shortened the active infantry service term from three years to two.
15
 Finally 
Russia, after its 1904-05 defeat by Japan, not only diverted half its rearmament 
equipment budget to the navy but also suffered four years of poor harvests and 
budgetary stringency, while peasant unrest required several infantry divisions to be 
redeployed to the interior and dissension spread into the army.
16
 In turn, the evidence 
that Russia could not threaten Central Europe weakened the advocates in Berlin and 
Vienna of military expansion, thus completing the circle.  
 
All the pre-1914 Powers were relatively open societies, with elected legislatures and 
uncensored media. Army laws were expensive and removed more sons and husbands 
from their families and employees from their workplaces. They therefore tended to be 
unpopular, and business lobbyists were too weak unaided to force up military 
production targets.  Pre-1914 armaments manufacture was a mixed economy in which 
state arsenals operated alongside private enterprises that had grown up since the mid-
nineteenth century, such as Armstrong and Vickers in Britain, Schneider in France, 
Krupp in Germany, Škoda in Austria, and Putilov in Russia. To operate at full 
capacity they had to supplement domestic demand by export orders. Most of them 
were more committed to warship than to army supply, however, and even Krupp – the 
largest and best-connected armaments firm in Europe – made higher profits on its 
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naval than on its land artillery arm.
17
 None the less, in the winter of 1911-12 the 
German authorities decided on a Rüstungswende or ‘armaments turning point’ 
whereby their expenditure priority switched from dreadnoughts to the army. 
 
The Action-Reaction Model. This leads on to the third approach: the action-reaction 
model of a spiral of reciprocal armaments increases in response to perceived external 
threats. In itself it is a descriptive metaphor carrying little explanatory weight, as it 
fails to account for how the upward spiral starts in the first place. It none the less 
remains the most applicable of the three to the pre-1914 land armaments race, but 
only if located within the context of the shifting Continental strategic balance and of 
Europe’s diplomatic alignments and flashpoints.   
 
The first fundamental to bring into the equation is Russia, whose power position 
collapsed after the Japanese war but then bounced back. Between 1904 and 1908 the 
Central Powers of Austria-Hungary and Germany were unusually secure. After 1909, 
in contrast, a run of good harvests defused Russian internal unrest and boosted 
government revenue, much of which the tsarist authorities channelled into 
rearmament.
18
 These factors enabled the Russian military reorganization of 1910, the 
development with the best claim to be the starting pistol for the pre-war land 
armaments race. Its central feature was the adoption of a territorial mobilization 
system enabling the army to transition faster from peacetime to wartime strength, 
prior to the ‘concentration’ or troop transports to the deployment zone. Admittedly the 
centre of gravity of the peacetime force distribution was simultaneously pulled back 
eastwards from the tip of the Polish salient toward the base, and Russia’s 1910 
concentration plan was cautious and defensive. The reorganization’s architects hoped 
to increase the army’s efficiency for operations in any direction rather than 
specifically against the Central Powers.
19
 But in Berlin and Vienna it was the speedier 
mobilization that focused attention.
20
 Moreover, Russia’s revival was only just 
beginning. In 1912 the Russians adopted a much more aggressive war plan. They 
intensified their staff conversations with the French and in December 1913 they 
concluded a railway agreement that by 1917-18 would enable them to transport their 
mobilized divisions up to 30 per cent faster to the deployment zone.
21
 On 7 July 1914 





The impact of the tilting military balance was amplified by the pre-war diplomatic 
crises. The interaction between these crises and rearmament was integral to the 
dynamics of international politics in the period, the first and second Moroccan crises 
of 1905-06 and 1911 being followed by the Bosnian annexation crisis of 1908-09 and 
the ‘winter crisis’ accompanying the First Balkan War in 1912-13. These crises came 
ever faster, and each was more acute than its predecessor. Each was also more 
militarized, prompting greater military preparations, so that across Europe nearly 
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three quarters of a million men above the normal peacetime quotas were with the 
colours by early 1913.
23
 The First Moroccan Crisis encouraged a temporary burst of 
re-equipment in France and Germany but its effects were otherwise limited, although 
it did encourage Britain to strengthen its ties with Russia and France. The Bosnian 
annexation crisis had more serious consequences because Russia found itself unable 
to risk a war and was therefore humiliated, which spurred its leaders towards 
rearmament and the reorganization of 1910. The Second Moroccan, or Agadir, Crisis, 
conversely, led directly to the Germans’ Rüstungswende decision to prioritize land 
rearmament at the navy’s expense. Finally, the First Balkan War precipitated a new 
power shift in the Balkans, where Russia’s protégés, Serbia and Montenegro, seized 
territory from Ottoman Turkey and menaced Austria-Hungary’s southern frontier. Not 
only did the Balkan crisis end the Hungarians’ resistance to army increases; it also 
encouraged Germany to introduce another bill, which became the army law of 1913. 
This measure in turn prompted France to revert from two-year to three-year active 
service, as well as to approve a major equipment credit; while the Russians (though 
here the connection with the Balkans was less direct) introduced their ‘Great 
Programme’ for army expansion over four years.  
 
The public discourse of the period (particularly the legislative debates) confirms that 
by 1913 the Powers were responding to the international political environment rather 
than to technological changes or internal pressures. It is true that the internal pressures 
were greater than previously, but this was primarily because the diplomatic crises had 
inflamed popular nationalism. The ‘nationalist revival’ in France in 1912-13, and the 
formation in 1912 of the Deutscher Wehrverein (German Defence League), which 
grew to 360,000 affiliated members and lobbied for a big army increase, are the best 
examples. However, even the 1913 German military law was less than the DWV 
wanted, and armaments competition also strengthened opposition to military 
preparedness from socialists and progressives. In fact it polarized public opinion, even 
if on balance by 1912-13 the domestic obstacles to military legislation had lessened.   
 
The confidential files shed more light on the real motives for the arms increases. 
These were partly deterrence. The Austro-Hungarian Government believed that the 
Bosnian frontier was too exposed to Serbian attack, and wanted to safeguard it by rail 
construction and larger protection forces. Reinforcement against surprise of the 
‘couverture’ or covering garrison was also a professed justification for France’s three-
year service law. But a second objective was more successful crisis management if 
further trials of strength none the less occurred. Russia is the outstanding example: the 
tsarist authorities in autumn 1912 first conducted a ‘trial mobilization’ and then 
omitted to release as normal their oldest conscript cohort, thus boosting their standing 
army by 350,000 men.
24
 Conversely one of the arguments invoked for the German 
1912 army law was disappointment over the 1911 Agadir Crisis, which suggested that 
Germany’s navy was ineffective as a means of political pressure and a reinforced 
army might do better.  
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The final purpose behind the land build-up, however, was to improve the chances of 
victory if deterrence and crisis management failed.
25
 A change in the tone of 
confidential memoranda can be detected as tension mounted and successive alerts 
accustomed leaders to contemplating the eventuality of hostilities. Thus the Russians 
prepared a scheme known as the ‘Period Preparatory to War’ for accelerating 
mobilization, which German intelligence would detect when it was implemented in 
July 1914.
26
 In addition, the new armaments measures were connected with 
developments in strategic planning. France is the best example, the three-year law 
being intended partly to prepare the army for the headlong offensive into Germany 
entailed in the 1913-14 Plan XVII, which replaced a previous counterstroke scheme. 
Russia similarly in its concentration schedule ‘19 revised’ of 1912 and its schedule 20 
of 1914 adopted plans for an immediate double invasion of Austria-Hungary and of 
Germany instead of its previous defensive-offensive strategy.
27
 The Germans, 
conversely, had long intended to start by throwing their main forces westwards and 
invading France via Belgium.
28
 But their 1912 and 1913 army laws and their 1914 
plans for eastern fortifications and trunk railway building were intended to maintain 
that strategy’s viability when the General Staff believed the altering strategic balance 
threatened to undermine it.  
 
The Anglo-German naval race was a major reason for the British Government’s and 
public’s acceptance of war with Germany.29 Moreover, the German authorities in 
1914 may have been encouraged to risk hostilities before the ratio in capital ships 
moved further against them.
30
 But the land arms race more directly influenced the 
decisions that escalated a Balkan crisis into a European war. In the Balkans a local 
armaments competition had been under way since 1906 between Austria-Hungary on 
the one hand and Serbia and Montenegro on the other. The Balkan Wars of 1912-13 
had run down Serbia’s finances, weapons, and ammunition, and in spring 1914 it was 
searching desperately for rifles. ‘Apis’ (Dragutin Dimitrijević), the head of the Black 
Hand organization in Belgrade that supplied the Sarajevo assassins with their bombs 
and revolvers, may have mistakenly supposed the Archduke Franz Ferdinand to be the 
leader of the war party in Vienna, and have hoped by killing him to postpone a 
                                                 
25
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showdown with Austria-Hungary; but his actions had the opposite effect.
31
 For 
Austria-Hungary, conversely, 1914 was a relatively favourable moment for Balkan 
operations, though launching a European war - as even the ultra-hawkish CGS Franz 
Conrad von Hötzendorff acknowledged - was a desperate gamble, conceivable only if 
Germany endorsed it. But this the Germans did. The Prussian War Minister Erich von 
Falkenhayn advised in July 1914 that his army was ready;
32
 CGS Helmuth von 
Moltke the Younger had briefed Chancellor Theobald von Bethman Hollweg that the 
1913 military law was already largely implemented and the German army stood in a 
relatively strong position, whereas the 1913 military service extension had 
temporarily diluted the quality of the French army, which also lacked a good modern 
rifle or sufficient heavy artillery.
33
 By 1916, in contrast, the French military reforms 
would be taking effect, and by 1917-18 strategic railway building would enhance the 
Russian army’s striking power and the Great Programme would enlarge its mobilized 
strength and its artillery, while the 1913 Belgian military law would reinforce the 
garrisons of the Liège and Namur fortresses that German planning required to be 
seized quickly. Conversely, the expense first of the dreadnought race and then of land 
rearmament had pushed the German Reich finances into deficit, and the 1913 army 
law had been paid for by a one-off wealth tax that had needed Socialist support to 
pass through the Reichstag. Further rounds of spending would politically be extremely 





If the German army had reasons to act quickly, for France and Russia war had been 
inconceivable five years earlier but now they felt able to risk hostilities rather than 
back down. In 1905 the French Premier had sacked his foreign minister rather than 
resist Germany’s demands; in 1908-09 Russia had acquiesced in Austria-Hungary’s 
annexation of Bosnia in large part because its armed forces were in no condition to 
risk a European war. But by 1911-12 French General Staff appraisals were becoming 
more confident that France and Russia could win such a war, and they communicated 
their optimism to St Petersburg.
35
 In July 1914 the Russian War and Navy Ministers 
supported the Foreign Minister in a policy of firmness, and were even enthusiastic 
about the possibility of hostilities.
36
 The French President, Raymond Poincaré, may 
have feared that after a swing to the left in recent elections the National Assembly 
would weaken the Three-Year Law that autumn.
37
 In Britain the Cabinet appears not 
to have sought a military appraisal, but the Director of Military Operations, Sir Henry 
Wilson, was familiar with French thinking,
38
 and Prime Minister Herbert Asquith and 
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Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey were aware of an Admiralty economic warfare 
scheme that aimed to paralyse Germany’s trading and financial system.39 The key 
point is that both sides saw the Central Powers as being on a downward trajectory and 
their opponents as on an upward one, and this perception encouraged them first to risk 
and then to accept hostilities. The armaments race and the associated shift in the 
military balance by no means constitute a sufficient explanation of the outbreak of 
war, but they did form a necessary precondition for it and are critical to an 
understanding of its timing.  
 
-II- 1866-1870  
 
We now turn to the arms race before the Franco-Prussian war of 1870. In this period 
the diplomatic alignments were more fluid, and the contest not between two coalitions 
but between Prussia (after 1867 the North German Confederation) and the French 
Second Empire. Whereas the pre-1914 land armaments race was primarily qualitative 
and in manpower, that before 1870 was qualitative as well as quantitative and took 
place against the backdrop of the introduction of steel, breech-loading weapons with 
rifled barrels both for the infantry (to replace the smooth-bore muzzle-loading 
musket) and for the field artillery, at the same time as railways were adopted for 
deployment and supply.
40
 Despite these contrasts between the two periods, however, 
there were also striking similarities, especially in the relationship between the 
armaments race and the outbreak of hostilities.  
 
At the beginning of the 1860s most observers considered the French army to be the 
best in Europe. This judgement seemed borne out by its performance in the Crimean 
War and by its victories over Austria in the Italian war of 1859. In the latter year 
Prussia’s partial mobilization in support of Austria had exposed serious weaknesses in 
its mobilization system, which the new team of Regent Wilhelm (later King Wilhelm 
I), War Minister Albrecht von Roon, and CGS Helmuth von Moltke the Elder was 
determined to remedy.
41
 Initially their rearmament efforts were intended to reinforce 
the country’s military power in general, and as a precaution against war with France, 
Russia, or Austria rather than against France particularly. The Prussian army had been 
the first in Europe to introduce a breech-loading rife – the Dreyse needle gun 
(Zundnadelgewehr) – as its standard infantry weapon, in a transition that proceeded 
gradually from 1843 onwards.
42
 Moltke stepped up planning to use railways for 
mobilization and concentration, and tested it in exercises.
43
 But Wilhelm’s key 
concern was manpower. Prussia was unusual in having preserved a short-service mass 
conscription system after the Napoleonic wars: under the law of 1814 men served 
three years in the standing army and two in its reserves before transferring to the 
second-line Landwehr, but the mass was not very mass and the standing army had 
                                                 
39
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lagged behind the country’s growth in population.44 The 1860 reform bill would lower 
the military service term to three years, but expand the conscript uptake and place 
regular officers in command of the Landwehr units.
45
 It aimed to strengthen the 
standing army but also to align the Landwehr more closely with the standing force in 
equipment, training, and discipline. Wilhelm had a domestic agenda - he remembered 
the 1848 revolution and wanted to strengthen royal power relative to the progressive 
liberal opposition - but in addition he and his advisers sought to counter Prussia’s 
exposed geographical position and enhance its diplomatic leverage. According to the 
British military attaché, the law would have not been worth the trouble were it not for 
the need ‘to enable Prussia as a first-rate power to maintain her position amongst 
other European nations’.46 None the less, liberal parliamentarians concerned about the 
internal political balance resisted the measure, and Prince Otto von Bismarck was 
brought in as Minister-President in 1862 in order to impose it.
47
 Only after Prussia 
defeated Austria in the Six-Weeks War of 1866 did the liberals split, the majority 
voting to justify retrospectively the government’s actions by means of the 1867 
Indemnity Law.
48
 As after 1910, in fact, external events generated popular support for 
arms increases, rather than the other way round. The needle gun, the speed of railway-
backed mobilization and concentration, and the new increments of trained manpower 





It was after 1866 that France responded, and this year should therefore be seen as the 
beginning of the Franco-German arms race. During the Revolutionary Wars France 
had pioneered the principle of universal liability to military service, but under the 
post-1815 Restoration it had reverted to a long-service system, and even after 
Napoleon III established the Second Empire the pace of military change was slow. 
Part of the explanation was that Napoleon had also been engaged in a naval race 
against the British, which had now lost impetus.
50
 But in addition, conservative 
professional opinion held that a long-service army was a more effective fighting 
force, and better able to adapt to the incoming new weaponry. France had a system of 
seven-year engagements, and many of its soldiers were battle hardened, but unlike 
their Prussian counterparts they could not be rapidly reinforced. During the war of 
1866 Napoleon felt he lacked the capacity for timely intervention in Central Europe, 
and at a summit conference at Compiègne in November he insisted on a manpower 
                                                 
44
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 His regime, however, was in transition from an autocratic to a 
parliamentary system. After 1866 French public opinion switched rapidly to viewing 
the new North German Confederation as the principal threat to national security, a 
perception that would endure for the next eighty years.
52
 Yet this perception did not 
translate into support for a larger conscript cohort, and Napoleon encountered 
opposition both from the legislators and from the high command, on the grounds that 
his reform would increase burdens on civilians and diminish military effectiveness.
53
 
Initially he wanted to be able to call up all able-bodied men for service either in the 
standing army or in the reserves, but the loi Niel steered through by War Minister 
General Adolphe Niel in 1868 fell short of the Emperor’s hopes and primarily 
reinforced the second-line troops of the garde nationale mobile.
54
 In contrast, French 
equipment spending rose sharply and had tangible consequences: the issue of one 
million chassepot rifles (which were superior to the needle gun), as well as of smaller 
numbers of prototype machine guns (mitrailleuses).
55
    
 
These French efforts were insufficient to nullify the Germans’ advantage, and after 
defeating Austria the latter took further steps. The armaments competition was now 
linked to an intensified political rivalry that generated a succession of crises. 
Napoleon unavailingly sought ‘compensation’ in the Low Countries for Prussia’s 
new-won domination over northern Germany, and warned that further expansion into 
Southern Germany would constitute a casus belli. But Bismarck intended precisely 
such expansion, and already in 1867 the Prussian military system was extended to the 
other members of the emergent North German Confederation.
56
 Whereas initially 
domestic calculations had contributed to the government’s enthusiasm for reform, the 
external situation was now primary. Although the Prussians stuck with the now 
outdated needle gun, they replaced their artillery (which had proved inferior to the 
Austrian cannon) by new steel-barrelled Krupp breech-loaders, which the French 
failed to match.
57
 Finally, the General Staff presided over further railway 
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improvements, which ensured that in 1870 the Germans’ mobilization was faster than 




By the time of the crisis of July 1870, therefore, both sides’ military chiefs had 
grounds for considering the moment favourable to take the plunge. Before doctoring 
the Ems Despatch – the crucial step that provoked France into declaring war – 
Bismarck consulted Moltke and Roon, who said that the army was ready. Moltke 
respected Niel and believed it was better to fight now than wait for the French to 
increase their manpower and modernize their weapons.
59
 But the advice of Niel’s 
successor General Edmond Leboeuf appears likewise to have been crucial for the 
French cabinet.
60
 Notoriously, Leboeuf affirmed that the French army was ready ‘to 
the last gaiter button’, but he had reason to believe that reforms had made progress 
and that French infantry firepower had grown.
61
 Like Poincaré in 1914, he feared that 
soon the French legislature would impose retrenchment.
62
 The French also hoped that 
success in the first encounters would bring in Austria and Italy.
63
 These forecasts 
proved to be completely mistaken, and whereas in 1914 Germany’s military 
advantage really had been significantly eroded, in 1870 it had not.
64
 None the less we 
can see again the imminence of a crossover point or power transition – one side 
moving downwards while the other moved up – as the dangerous time.  
 
- III- 1887-1893  
                                                                                                                                                                               
As a final example we may turn to an arms race that exhibited similar features to 
those of the 1910s and 1860s but did not end in war. Samuel Huntington, Grant 
Hammond, and  Allan Mitchell have all discerned a Franco-German arms race after 
1870, but they differ about its dating and on whether it merits inclusion in the 
canonical list.
65
 After 1870 Franco-German diplomatic tensions persisted (war scares 
occurring in 1873 and especially 1875). The French expanded their conscript uptake 
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by a law of 1872, though in this respect still lagged behind the Germans.
66
 They 
began upgrading their artillery, institutionalized strategic planning, and strengthened 
their network of trunk railways leading towards the north-eastern border. By 1890 
they may have matched or even exceeded the Germans in transport capacity.
67
 In 
addition, both sides invested heavily in fortifying their new post-1871 frontiers.
68
 
Other countries also adopted versions of the Prussian recruitment system, including 
Austria-Hungary in 1868, Russia in 1874, and Italy in 1871/76.
69
 But apart from the 
French, who - as might be expected from a defeated Power - maintained much higher 
equipment spending than before 1866, the pace of military innovation in the 1870s 





From the mid-1880s, in contrast, we can see a new upsurge in army budgets, less 
dramatic than that of 1910-14 but displaying common features with it.
71
 In this period 
too, diplomatic tension accompanied a series of army bills. Again technological 
innovation was one element in spending increases, at this point primarily due to the 
introduction of the small-bore repeating magazine rifle using smokeless high-
explosive propellants, which enabled a longer range and faster rate of fire without 
producing smoke clouds that betrayed the marksman’s location. All the European 
infantries re-equipped themselves with these devices, starting with the French Lebel 
rifle in 1886, and continuing with the German Gewehr 88 (1888), the Austrian 
Mannlicher (1888), the Russian Mosin (1891), and the British Lee-Enfield (1895).
72
 
Smokeless powder was one aspect of a broader transition from gunpowder to 
chemical explosives, which also threatened obsolescence for the brick and mortar 
fortresses that protected the French, German, Russian, and Austrian borders. In fact 
after a pause for reappraisal the Continental Powers continued to invest in 
fortification, but at more concentrated locations and with radically modified designs 
that centred on earth-protected installations of reinforced concrete. This, however, 
was not the main reason for the spending bulge.
73
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Instead, the leading feature of the armaments race in this period too was a sequence of 
army laws, passed by France and by Austria-Hungary in 1889, and by Germany in 
1887, 1888, 1890, and 1893. In the Balkans, Serbia and Bulgaria followed suit.
74
  
Italy’s army budget reached its nineteenth-century peak in 1888-89, and although 
Russia did not pass legislation (before 1906 it had no elected parliament) it too 
expanded its standing army.
75
 Generally the increases were smaller than in 1912-13, 
and the standard term of service with the colours was reduced (to three years in 
France and two in Germany), but these concessions to the legislatures were offset by 
cuts in the number of exemptions, so that the reserve of trained manpower would 
grow faster.
76
 In Austria-Hungary the annual conscript cohort rose only by 7,500 to 
103,100; but Germany’s 1893 law marked the biggest increase the country had yet 
seen, and in France whereas previously only half the annual cohort had served for the 
full five-year term, now 70% would serve for three years.
77
 Although parliaments 
were more willing to pass such legislation if the service term was shortened and 
exemptions were diminished, military service remained fundamentally unpopular. As 
after 1910, therefore, a menacing external political situation was needed before 
governments acted. In 1886-87 German anxiety once again centred on France, where 
a new War Minster, General Georges-Ernest Boulanger, intensified military 
preparedness and made inflammatory speeches that hinted at willingness for a war of 
revenge. The newly founded Ligue des Patriotes contributed to the xenophobic 
mood.
78
 Tension reached a climax when the Germans arrested Guillaume Schnaebelé, 
a French frontier agent (though later releasing him). In Eastern Europe, the 
Hohenzollern and Romanov dynasties had traditionally formed a common front 
against Polish nationalism and against revolution, but the German authorities were 
alarmed by the growth of anti-German sentiments in Russia and the emergence of 
economic and diplomatic tensions between the two countries. Germany’s ally, 
Austria-Hungary, was at loggerheads with Russia over Bulgaria, where Tsar 
Alexander III intervened unsuccessfully to back his candidate for the throne. War 
against Turkey in 1877-78 had disrupted Russia’s state finances, and the tsarist 
government had to restrict its weapons and railway spending, but it compensated by 
massively reinforcing its Polish frontier garrison.
79
 Whereas this development caused 
great anxiety in Berlin and Vienna,
80
 Russian intelligence was alarmed by the extent 
of Austrian military preparations.
81
 In 1888 and 1889 Italy feared a French attack,
82
 
                                                                                                                                            
insufficiently garrisoned, and not kept updated. Clayton Donnell, The Forts of the Meuse in World War 
I (Oxford, 2007), pp. 9, 13.  
74
 Fraser to Phipps, 11 Sept. 1889, TNA FO/881/5943. 
75
 The Russian army’s peacetime strength had averaged 35,000 officers and 850,000 men in 1881-85, 
but rose by 1894 to 35,000 officers and 940,000 men: Bruce Menning, Bayonets before Bullets: the 
Imperial Russian Army, 1861-1914  (Bloomington, 1992), p. 108. On Italy, Gooch, Army, State, and 
Society, p. 58-9.  
76
 C. à Court, ‘Progress in the French Army in 1893’; E. Agar, ‘Progress &c. in the German Army to 
the End of 1893’, both January 1894, TNA WO/33/54. 
77
 Rothenberg, Army of Francis Joseph, p. 109; Challener, French Theory, 60.  
78
 For example, Waldersee to Bismarck, 16 Nov. 1886, GP, VI, doc. 1234.  
79
 Between 1883 and 1893 the Russian garrison in Poland was raised from 227,000 to 610,000, a more 
forward deployment and higher readiness being seen as deterrents against attack: William C. Fuller, Jr,, 
Strategy and Power in Russia 1600-1914 (New York, 1992), pp. 342-43 
80
 Russell to Malet, 1 Jan. 1891, TNA FO/881/6171; Paget to Salisbury, 11 Oct. 1888, TNA FO/ 
7/1135; cf. Monts to Bismarck, 7 Nov. 1887, Deines report, 9 Nov. 1887, GP, VI, docs 1150, 1151.  
81
 Fuller, Strategy and Power, p. 336; cf. Alan J. P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-
1918 (London, 1971), ch. 14.  
 14 
and in 1890-91 a major diplomatic turning point occurred when after years of a 
developing Franco-Russian rapprochement Berlin failed to renew its ‘Reinsurance 
Treaty’ with St Petersburg and the latter negotiated a defensive alliance with Paris.  
 
These diplomatic developments bore directly on the armaments history of the period, 
most evidently in Germany. Bismarck justified his 1886 Septennat (or seven-year 
army bill) as being necessary against the French threat, and eventually called an 
election on the issue.
83
 His successor, Leo Count Caprivi, justified the 1893 law as a 
response to the shift in the balance in favour of France and Russia and as a means of 
controlling the Russians via deterrence. He too had to call a Reichstag election before 
he could pass the measure.
84
 Duties on beer and spirits and on stock market 
transactions had to rise, but according to the British Ambassador, Germany’s ‘dislike 
of increased taxation [is] more than balanced by a perception of the necessity of 
keeping pace with the French armaments.’85  Conversely, the French 1889 law was 
justified publicly on grounds of equalizing the conscription burden but also as a 
method of maximizing trained manpower, and the 1888-93 War Minister Charles-
Louis de Freycinet introduced it as part of a complex of measures to enhance army 
effectiveness.
86
 In the east, Russia’s and Austria-Hungary’s military efforts can be 
seen similarly as responses to the confrontation between them during the 1887 
Bulgarian crisis.
87
 In all these respects, similarities are evident with the European 
conjuncture at the time of the emergence of the pre-First World War land armaments 
race between 1908 and 1912.  
 
In contrast to the later period, however, this intensification in the arms race did not 
culminate in hostilities. In 1870 and in 1914 the Berlin leaders went to war at a 
moment when their military superiority seemed to be coming under challenge, by 
French rearmament and by Franco-Russian rearmament respectively. In the late 1880s 
the German military chiefs had similar fears of being overhauled: the elder Moltke 
had advocated preventive war against France in 1875 and against Russia in 1887. But 
Bismarck overruled him on both occasions, and enjoyed the emperor’s backing. The 
chancellor resisted launching a preventive war, even when (as in the winter of 1887-
88) he was almost completely isolated. He maintained instead that rearmament could 
keep the peace.
88
 He was assisted by disagreements within the military establishment 
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over whether the army should be expanded to meet foreign challenges even if this 
weakened its internal reliability. Moreover, Moltke publicly doubted by 1890 whether 
short, sharp victories over major Powers were still possible.
89
 French fortress building 
seemed to rule out another quick invasion of France, and the General Staff 
increasingly doubted whether rapid success was possible against Russia. After 1890 
the solution devised by Alfred von Schlieffen as CGS would be to outflank the French 
fortresses by attacking the less formidable Belgian ones, but that concept was 
incorporated into the concentration schedules only after 1905.
90
 In the absence of a 
viable offensive strategy, the purpose of Bismarck’s and Caprivi’s rearmament 
became to reinforce deterrence.  
 
On the other side, France and Russia were relatively easy to deter. It is true that their 
general staffs saw the Caprivi Law as strengthening Germany’s offensive power, and 
as a consequence the Russians agreed not only to an alliance with France but also to a 
military convention.
91
 But the Boulangist movement collapsed in 1889 and in the 
following decade the growth of French military spending decelerated.
92
 Both the 
financial and the demographic effort entailed (given France’s much lower birth rate 
than Germany’s) had reached the maximum that was politically feasible, and the 1889 
Freycinet Law like the 1893 Caprivi one would take many years to maximize the pool 
of trained manpower.
93
 In contrast, Russia’s spending continued to grow, and an 
economic boom during the 1890s expanded the funding available for tsarist 
rearmament. Much of this extra increase, however, was directed towards Asia rather 
than Europe. After 1887 there were no more major Balkan crises for two decades, and 
in 1897 Russia and Austria-Hungary reached an agreement to place the Near East ‘on 
ice’: in other words to respect the status quo.94 The Franco-Russian alliance should 
not be seen as changing this picture, as its origins lay in France’s and Russia’s shared 
hostility to Britain as well as to Germany. Between 1884 and 1904 they were engaged 
in a building contest with the Royal Navy, to which the ‘two-power standard’ 
embodied in the 1889 Naval Defence Act and in subsequent construction programmes 
constituted London’s response.95 During the 1890s the most serious diplomatic crises 
occurred not in the Rhineland or the Balkans but outside Europe, where Britain 
clashed with France, Germany, and Russia in Africa and East Asia. By 1897-98 
Germany’s land situation was so favourable that Wilhelm II could embark on a major 
naval armaments effort against Britain while the German army’s peacetime strength 
remained virtually static. In other words, the 1887-93 land armaments race ended in 
relative stability at a higher level of armaments, in part because both sides remained 
deterred, but also because the late 1880s diplomatic crises lacked longer-term 
repercussions, Caprivi commenting by 1890 that there was no imminent danger of 
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 It was this stability that Russia’s collapse after 1904, and the associated new 
run of diplomatic crises, would overturn.   
 
-IV- Conclusion  
 
This chapter has investigated three examples of land armaments races. In each case 
German military superiority was challenged by France or by France in association 
with others. All three races were partly technological, qualitative competitions, 
although that of 1866-70 most so and that of 1910-14 least: which gives mixed 
endorsement to Huntington’s thesis that quantitative races are the most dangerous.97 
In all three cases public support for extended conscription was feeble, although it 
strengthened partly as a consequence of armaments expansion. However, domestic 
resistance seems to have constrained France more than Prussia in the 1860s, both 
sides about equally in the 1880s and 1890s, and the Central Powers more than their 
opponents in 1910-14. The role of lobbying by a ‘military-industrial complex’ seems 




These arms races must be seen in relationship to others, and terrestrial and maritime 
armaments competition viewed in conjunction. Until the 1860s France was engaged in 
naval rivalry with Britain, although in 1866 it belatedly switched its attention back to 
land armaments. In the 1880s and 1890s France and Russia again challenged the 
Royal Navy, thereby limiting their resources against the Central Powers. Conversely, 
after 1897, and especially after 1908, Germany prioritized its naval contest with 
Britain at the expense of its army (while Austria-Hungary after 1904 engaged in naval 
rivalry against Italy). Only with the Rüstungswende of 1911-12 did Germany re-
emphasize land armaments, but now in circumstances where its alliance bloc’s 
advantage was dwindling rapidly, and dwindling still more rapidly after the Balkan 
Wars.  
 
Most weight has been given here to the action-reaction model as an explanatory 
framework, while underlining its inadequacies if divorced from its diplomatic and 
political context. Whereas both the 1866-70 and 1910-14 races developed suddenly, 
after the Austro-Prussian War and the Russian military reorganization (bearing out 
another Huntington insight - that the initial phases are the riskiest), that of 1897-93 
reflected a more gradual intensification of established tensions. None the less, in 
Bismarck’s words, ‘War never explodes like a lightning bolt; it is always preceded by 
grave antagonisms…’99 One conclusion from the analysis might seem that armaments 
competition is most destabilizing at the point of crossover or power transition when 
one side threatens to overhaul the other.
100
 This finding should direct attention 
towards other impending crossover points, as when Britain and France closed in on 
Germany in the late 1930s, when the United States surged ahead of the Soviet Union 
in the early 1960s, and perhaps as the PRC narrows the gap with the United States 
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 In all these instances we see not a stable equilibrium but an unstable one 
with one side moving up and the other moving down – or at least according to both 
sides’ perceptions. Such conjunctures have not, however, invariably ended in 
hostilities: and although in both 1870 and 1914 the Germans acted to forestall a 
crossover, in the 1880s they were inhibited from doing so. Moreover, even in spring 
1914 the Berlin leaders were still considering non-violent alternatives such as new 
rounds of railway or fortress construction (or intensified conscript call-ups) that might 
preserve their military advantage. They were not compelled to react so forcefully after 
the Sarajevo assassinations, any more than the French were compelled to after the 
Ems Despatch. In considering why wars break out, therefore, arms races must always 
be placed within their political context. They have a vital – and unjustly neglected – 
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